The cornerstone of the 1977 and 1981 Farm impacts that should not occur under the efficient Bills for crops is a buffer stock-supply manageoperation of a supply management strategy. ment program involving the farmer-owned reserve and acreage adjustment instruments.
GRAIN MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS Among the several reasons normally cited for adopting this type program is price and income
As indicated by Burntein in reviewing the stability. However, recent swings in commodity 1977 Farm Bill, major reasons for implementing prices, net farm income and government prothe reserve program were to (1) moderate margram costs have stimulated widespread interest ket instability, (2) maintain reasonable price in farm program redesign and modification in levels for producers and consumers, and (3) 1985. Before joining this chorus, it may be provide reliable supplies for domestic and forworthwhile to reexamine the operation of this eign markets. It was implicitly assumed that the supply management program to discern the feamanaged buffer stocks would be more effective sibility of this type of design in the current i producing these results than the free market, economic-political environment. In order to acr that the free market would be less efficient complish this objective, an econometric model i assuring reserve levels necessary to produce of the U.S. crops -livestock sector was utilized.
these results. Four program designs were simulated over the Implicit in these criteria is the notion of the crop years 1970 through 1979, which included value of price stabilization, since the buffer periods of scarcity and surplus. These options stock system addresses price stabilization as opemploy the supply management program with posed to price support. It is often argued that four alternative management strategies, some price stability for agricultural producers leads relying more heavily on acreage reduction and to greater efficiency (Hallett, Houck) . Also, reothers on the reserve program. Conclusions serves in lean years reduce the danger of food drawn from these program simulations serve as
shortage. This, in turn, reduces sharp price a focal point for evaluating the 1982-83 Rechanges for grain inputs to the livestock and duced Acreage Program and the Payment-Infood grain sectors, resulting in less erratic price Kind Program in 1983-84. changes at the retail market. Thus, stabilization has a dual focus, price protection for the proIn general these results indicate that the supducer and the consumer. Major questions for a ply management program can be balanced or managed reserve program are the price band to imbalanced depending upon the set of manbe used in its operation and the level of stocks agement rules that are followed. By implication, required to assure that prices within the range consistent adherence to the management rules can be maintained at minimum government cost. over time is desirable unless there is evidence of imbalance. A conclusion of this paper is that
The 1977 Farm Program for Wheat and the significant players in the political process Feedgrains of management and operation (Administration, Congress, and Budget) did not reach compro-
The 1977 Farm Bill adopted by the Congress mises on program design in 1982-83 and 1983-combined a modified buffer stock program 84 that conform to a balanced set of rules. As (farmer owned reserve) with an acreage ada result, the industry has been subjected to justment program. While price corridors and Price measures were taken to reduce reserves, loans 3.26 Call price 3. 26 Call priceppy had to be repaid within 90 days. Supply 2.81
Release price
Inter-Year Rules (Acreage Adjustment)
A second facet of the program was the inter-
..
------------"Desired"--year rules available to maintain the price cor- year at the bottom of the corridor-then a setaside program is instituted. An assessment of this type resulted in a set-aside for feedgrains and wheat in 1983 reserve objectives were set, significant modifiand 198-9 199-8 198-8 84 and 1984-85 crop years. cations to the simple concept of a buffer stock Alternatively, if proected demand is strong It should be noted that a very crucial facet of this program strategy is the necessity for The program was designed to operate so that forward supply and utilization estimates conthe expected price in a "good crop" year would ditioned on a forward price objective. remain between the loan and release price a high percentage of the time. In short crop years, The 81 arm Program for Feedgrains the price would remain between the release and Wheat and the call price a high percentage of the time. In years with large crops, the price would be
The 1981 farm program for feedgrains and maintained between the loan and the desired wheat was a modification of the 1977 program. price. To maintain this price corridor, a set of A significant feature of the 1981 Farm Bill as within or intra-year incentives were utilized to proposed by the administration was centered manipulate the reserve level. If, for example, around reserve operation and elimination of supply was strong relative to demand, implying target prices. The ensuing legislation resulted an equilibrium price below the loan, reserve in a mandatory sequence of target prices with placements were induced to a level sufficient higher maximums for farmer-owned reserves, to at least support the loan price. The reserves which was mandatory for feedgrains and wheat. scheme involved farmers holding grain rather Also, the bill gave discretionary authority to the than direct government purchases. Farmers who Secretary for setting release prices. Specifically, had participated in government programs (in the release-call price mechanism was replaced set-aside years) or complied with normal crop by a single release price with discretionary auacreage (in no-set-aside years) had an option to thority on setting the release. Farmers were not place either feedgrain or wheat into the reserve. required to repay loans at the release, however There was no such option for soybeans, cotton, the Secretary was given authority to raise inand rice.
terest rates and discontinue storage payments. Finally, new maximums were set on grain flowTo reduce price in periods of tight supply, ing into the reserve. Maximums, if set by the strong demand or both, economic incentives for Secretary, could not be less than 700 million holding reserve grains are relaxed at two spebushels of wheat and 1 billion bushels of feedcific price levels. First, when the market price grain. exceeded the release price, storage payments Formulas for loan rates were modified with were discontinued and farmers could market new specified minimums and authority to inthe grain without penalty. If, however, the marcrease and decrease below minimums under ket price exceeded the call price, then stronger certain conditions. Discretionary authority was not given for target prices. Rather, a prescribed while maintaining the cross-commodity sequence of target prices were mandated for linkages. The other components of the the duration of the program. Rates of increase model are the acreage response, invenin these prices have exceeded the rate of intory functions and the policy decision crease in production cost, resulting in an imrules. balanced situation relative to government (2) A dynamic simulation of the model was exposure in financing the program. validated over the historical period, takThe set-aside and paid diversion program oping actual set-aside and reserve policies tions were maintained in the 1981 Farm Bill.
as given. A new voluntary acreage control program was (3) Two sets of policy decision rules were added-"Acreage Reduction." Under this stratintroduced in conjunction with price egy, acreage limitation was based on a portion corridor objectives. The first set was for of base acreage, which provides a tighter rewithin year decisions. If, for example quirement in acreage reduction for program market price fell below the corridor, then compliance compared with the set-aside proreserve stocks were accumulated to the vision. This strategy has been used in the 1982-level where market price equaled the 83 and 1983-84 crop years with no requirement lower limit price. Alternativel if market for cross-compliance. That is, each commodity pric exceeded the upper limit price is viewed independently of any other commodthen reserve stocks ar placed bak on ity in regard to eligibility and provisions for the market until the market price equaled program participation. the upper limit price or until reserve stocks were exhausted. This rule was INTERACTIVE MODEL FOR EVALUATING rule was IE OPERACTIVE MODEL FOR EVAGELUATING designed to maintain prices within the F THE BUFFER STOCK PROGRAM E corridor whenever possible, i.e., if sufficient stocks were on hand to protect The quantitative model used for evaluating the upper limit price. These rules were alternative management strategies for the buffer used rather than using the set of instrustock program has several components (Baumes ments actually employed in the farmerand Meyers, Yanagida and Conway). First, the owned reserve. Thus the results apply markets have been modeled to permit interaceither to a government owned reserve tion across commodities, with linkage to export where purchases and sales occur or to markets and the livestock industry, and supply the current program where government response-acreage equations that react to market can set provisions to achieve reserve obprices, farm program variables, and input costs.
jectives. Also, these components have been specified to The second set of policy rules involved reflect government program variables and corinter-year rules based on estimated future responding operating rules. The behavioral expected price. If this estimated price characteristics of the model are represented by was below a specified acreage trigger the structural price elasticities in Table 1. level, then a set-aside was adopted for The procedure for developing the interactive the following year sufficient to raise exmodel in a policy mode involved the following pected price to the acreage trigger. Othsteps.
erwise a no-set-aside policy was adopted. (1) Derive the reduced-form price equations Again, the results using these simplified from the cross-commodity structural rules apply to mandatory controls or volmodel to simplify the analytical model untary programs where government can set provisions to achieve acreage objec-2. A farmer-owned reserve strategy was extives.
amined where the government provided (4) To compare alternative policies under incentives for farmers to lock-up reserve differing market conditions, each reserve grain when prices were low (below repolicy alternative was simulated over two lease level) and redeem and sell the grain historical periods, 1971-72 -1977-78 when prices were high (above release and 1974-75 -1980-81 . The first period price). The effective floor price (reserve began and ended with relatively low floor trigger) was set midway between the prices and weak markets but had a strong loan and release levels and the price was market period in between. The second an approximation of the ceiling price period began and ended with relatively (ceiling trigger). Alternative acreage trighigh prices and strong markets but had ger levels were selected to reflect the 1977 a weak market period in between. Each program and modifications suggested by simulation generated a scenario for: (1) the 1981 program which reduce reliance acreage diversion, (2) reserve activity, on acreage reductions.
(3) production, (4) stocks, (5) price, signed to represent the actual decision making process 1 year ahead for acreage diversion, was The four alternatives considered are given in the trend yield and export assumption. As the Table 2 . Each alternative has been evaluated for model moved forward in time, a "look ahead" two different levels of beginning reserves. In price considered trend yields and exports in general, five constraints can be preselected for making an acreage diversion decision. However, policy simulations based on this model. These when the model moved to the next year, actual include: (1) beginning reserve levels, (2) levels of yields and estimated exports were used.
acreage trigger price, (3) reserve floor trigger In some cases acreage diversions were put in price, (4) reserve ceiling trigger price, and (5) place when in fact a drought year such as 1974 upper reserve bounds. Of the four program actually occurred. Also, in some cases reserve strategies examined, three were variations of levels were permitted to exceed the upper bound the current supply management program. The levels for the same reason.
fourth involved minimum intervention by government.
Program Strategies
The acreage trigger price for each of the Two general management regimes for the programs examined are the forward price obbuffer stocks program were investigated.
jective. Estimated future price below this level 1. A minimum government intervention stratimplied acreage control for the next crop. Govegy was examined where the government ernment program variables were selected to enters stock accumulation to provide a stimulate the necessary program participation floor price at the loan rate but disposes and corresponding acreage to satisfy the forward of accumulated stocks as soon as price price objective or acreage trigger price. Actual recovers to 115 percent of the loan rate.
target price levels were used in every scenario. A paid diversion was used if forecasted price 1 year ahead was below loan rate.
Comparisons of Simulated Results

This is essentially the strategy in place
Results of these simulations point out the before the 1977 Act.
significance and importance of the "silent rules and loan rates as a management decision pa-.
rameter and attempted to adjust reserves and
Zero Beginning Reserves (1970-76) acreage to produce an equilibrium at about 113Average percent of the loan, Figure 2 . Reserves (1970-76) option goes to an extreme in the direction of Average (1970-76) reliance on the reserve and only removed land Thus, the total stock averages for the period Average (1970-76) were about 1.5 billion bushels of corn and 750 the farmer-owned reserve strategies. Reserves Zero Beginning Reserves (1973-79) were disposed of rapidly, and acreage control Average (1973-79) was utilized to support the loan rate. Therefore, towards the ceiling price, this prevents the use of the farmer-owned reserve as a means of reLand diversion is a crucial part of a balanced ducing deficiency payments. supply management program. Tables 3 and 4 In summary, these results tend to support the provide insight for the expected impact of alnotion that efficient operation of a supply manternative forward price objectives and diversion agement program is dependent on a very balstrategies. A balance between utilization of the anced set of operation rules. These rules are reserve and acreage control is necessary for critically dependent on four factors. efficient program operation.
Program strategy 1981-I is an example of 1. The price band for free market operation, management by reserves as opposed to acreage between the floor and ceiling prices, control. In most of the scenarios for corn and should contain the long-run average cost all scenarios for wheat, this strategy gave the of production and take account of cross lowest farm prices, the highest reserves, the commodity substitution. Since these bands highest government cost, and the lowest gross are established in the political environfarm revenues. ment, this responsibility falls to policy-A forward price objective or acreage trigger makers. price in a mid-range (Policy I) was generally 2. The forward price objective (acreage trigthe least expensive from a government standshould tend toward the center of the point, required less reserves and had higher price band. Acreage control becomes the farm prices and higher farm gross revenue. As most viable option when desired stock the acreage trigger price was lowered, the solevels are exceeded. lution moved toward less land diversion, increased reserve levels, and lower farm prices.
3. The capability to make accurate forward Government costs increased as reserves insupply and demand estimates at least 2 creased, farm prices were lower, and deficiency years in the future is essential.Continual payments were higher. optimism or pessimism on either the deLevels of beginning reserves had a significant mand or supply side can severely distort impact on the average level of reserves and the efficient program management. market price. The solution for 1 billion bushels 4. Balanced operation is critically dependent of corn and 400 million bushels of wheat beon program design for acreage control and ginning reserves for the period 1970-76 most reserve operations that can be readily connearly reproduced the average stock objectives verted into program participation with a of the 1977 program. According to Table 3, the high degree of confidence.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1982/
providing feed grains to the livestock industry 83 REDUCED ACREAGE PROGRAM FOR at stable prices, this strategy produced the op-CORN, WHEAT AND SOYBEANS posite effect. Grain was rationed to the market at prices normally experienced during drought The 1982-83 reduced acreage program for years. Third, an extremely good crop year furcrops, announced in January of 1982, required ther complicated the outcome of the program. a 10 percent acreage reduction for feedgrains This simply compounded the excess supply and 15 percent for wheat for loan and target problem in a year where program participation price protection. Producers were given the rewas very low. However, this outcome does tend duced acreage option with no cross compliance to reaffirm the importance of aligning the proconstraint. This program did not offer a divergram around a mid-level price objective -norsion payment. However, the incentive for parmal crop years yield prices in the center of the ticipants to place grain in the farmer-owned band, poor years at the top and good years at reserve was significantly increased over the the bottom. Program designs that do not assure 1981-82 program. Participants were given an sufficient participation simply increase the risk option of utilizing the Commodity Credit Corof prices near the bottom side of the price band poration (CCC) loan of $2.55 for corn and in normal years, compounding the down-side $3.55 for wheat. Placing grain in the 3-year price risk with the corresponding potential for farmer-owned reserve provided an entry loan stock accumulation. Fourth, final impacts have price of $2.90 per bushel for corn and $4.00 not likely occurred. The drought of 1983 in for wheat plus a 26.5 cents annual storage payconjunction with the PIK program resulted in ment. a significant decline in supplies. Currently, This program was a major departure from farmer-held reserves available to the market are previous designs in that the reserve option conin the hands of a small percentage of 1982 tained the major economic incentive to attract program participants. Therefore, strong potenprogram participation. As a result, this strategy tial exists for these producers to delay sales modified the rules for regulating the buffer stock with a significant upside price correction in the program. This weaker acreage program implies latter part of the 1983/84 marketing year. Fifth, a lower forward price objective but the strong for the first time in the history of the program, reserve incentive implies a large stock objective total government expenditures are very near net with a high floor price, farm income for the same period. This is an unfortunate outcome in a political climate where The negotiation process leading to this prototal budget expenditures will be more serigram design was conducted in an environment ously scrutinized in the future. of tight near term budget constraints and expectations of continued strength in the export market. Strong acreage control programs are more expensive in the near term than strategies THE 1983/84 PAYMENT-IN-KIND that rely on price support via manipulation of PROGRAM the farmer-owned reserve. This combination of events is more likely to yield the modifications The 1983-84 program is characterized by a in the program rules that were implemented in reduced acreage-paid diversion strategy supplethe 1982-83 program (Lesher) . Most of the conmented with a payment-in-kind (PIK) program. sequences of these modifications have already Farmers are given grain in payment for idling been experienced. First, utilization of this de-PIK acres. Reports by the USDA indicate that sign departed rather significantly from previous total acreage idled was about 82 million. programs, leaving very little or no observation This substantial reduction in acreage is almost data for sufficient evaluation of program particthree times the level projected by an analysis ipation. Second, after the feed grain harvest in at the University of Missouri in the Spring of the fall of 1982 and in the winter of . The models did not include participating farmers utilized the reserve at an and were not designed to estimate effects of a unprecedented rate thus shorting the market of PIK situation. The USDA most likely was in a free stocks. Farm price of corn moved from a similar position and clearly was surprised by low of $2.00/bu. in October of 1982 to almost the final level of participation. Although this $ 3.00 by April of 1983. Part of this price strength strategy was aimed at realignment, program demay have been attributable to the announced sign eminating from the political process was payment-in-kind (PIK) program; however, most such a drastic departure from previous designs estimates at that time indicated that, with or that substantial errors were made in estimating without PIK, prices would have to reach release participation. level to provide sufficient grain late in the crop What combination of events lead to the adopyear. Given concern over maintaining our comtion of a PIK program? Several reasons have petitive advantage in the export market and been given and perhaps were best summarized analysis suggests that the rather tight fisted budget constraint by Congress and the Office of by Lesher when he indicated that the political Management and Budget contribute to this outprocess was in no mood to further aggravate a come. Stated another way, the PIK program most record federal deficit, hence precluding tradilikely exceeded the mark necessary for program tional methods to reduce production. Although realignment. Part of this overkill can be attribthe agricultural sector has entered a period of uted to the inability of predicting with reasonpotential excess supply, the near term budget able accuracy farmer participation in this constraint looms high on the horizon as a major program design. obstacle in obtaining sufficient up front monies A similar case can be made for wheat, Table to effectively control the supply side.
7. Estimated government cost is about $2.6 Unfortunately, a tight budget environment billion higher under the PIK option; however, was further complicated by the desire for a farmer net revenues are only $220 million lower. "quick fix." This type of climate did not allow Table 8 reflects the cross impact on the soybean sufficient time to analyze the total ramifications industry under the different program options. of this program relative to alternative designs.
The design of the PIK program supports the Analyses conducted by the modeling unit at notion of a supply management strategy in that the University of Missouri after the March 1983 a strong acreage control program was necessary intentions report by the USDA indicated that a for realignment around forward price and stock stronger paid diversion strategy would have reobjectives. The most serious departure from the duced program cost by approximately one-half more balanced set of rules is the formulation for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton and rice, unof program design that could not easily be evalder a normal weather scenario, Table 5 . Reserve uated before the fact. Our ex post analysis suglevels, however, would have remained signifigests options that would have been less cantly higher, requiring a sequence of stepexpensive to the government and yielded simdown years to reach more reasonable stock levilar net returns to farmers. The trade-off under els. Table 6 reflects the normal weather scenario a stronger paid diversion option would have parative advantage in world trade and the level It should be noted that some analysts argue of escalating target prices. As a result, loan rates that the PIK option would cost less in the long were lowered for some commodities. However, run, since the grain would otherwise be dethe target price issue has not been resolved. faulted at the end of the 3-year contract. Present These levels of target price support precluded value analysis tends to support this notion. Howthe option of a zero reduced acreage program ever, this scenario is realized only if the grain for coarse grains and has resulted in a program for wheat that does not seem to be attractive to longer term path. The question to be anto producers. swered is whether the supply management proTarget prices have reached a level that subgram design is adequate to meet this economicstantially constrain the Secretary in managing political environment. The answer lies in two the farm program. A zero reduced acreage opareas. First, the operation of the program by all tion for feed grains would have exposed the the players in the political environment must administration for a crop program cost of around be clearly understood with regard to a balanced $4 million under a normal weather scenario.
set of rules governing operation. Second, nearer This rather significant government cost expoterm budget constraints must be examined relsure is a major constraint in program design.
ative to longer run government budget expo-1984 in conjunction with extremely low feedEven if the risk of an additional short crop in grains stocks implied no constraints on feedsure. If this does not occur, experience suggests grain production, that option is precluded that a different program strategy is warranted. because of budget exposure.
The current environment of excess supplies, Exactly the opposite situation has occurred budget constraints and high target prices for for wheat. High target price exposure resulted several commodities has reduced the necessary in a 30 percent reduced acreage and 20 percent flexibility for efficient management of the pro-PIK program participation. This program stratgrams. This conclusion is fairly evident from egy is still likely to result in an excess supply the design and conseuences of the 1982-83 imbalance for 1984-85 with wheat prices movand 1983-84 programs. Both options were ing at or near the loan rate. In this event govstrongly conditioned on meeting guideline ernment controlled stocks are very likely to budget constraints, apparently precluding more increase with corresponding longer term govtraditional options, thus subjecting program ernment cost exposure.
administration to more risky options. Unless the Thus, a more salient factor that removes the Secretary is given more flexibility in managing 1984-85 program design away from the more his budget and programs, the supply managebalanced supply management objectives is the ment strategy is doomed to failure. Supplies mandated target price moving near the top of cannot be effectively controlled. Hence, the the price band. Exposure of government costs most likely price over time is the loan rate preclude options that may be more feasible in with the potential for significant stock accuthe current environment. An additional factor mulation. In the longer term this could mean somewhat related to this situation is program another major modification similar to PIK. If base acreage. Currently about 92 million acres this buffer stock program design is maintained are in the wheat program; however, only about in the current budget environment, it may be 78 to 80 million are necessary for a supplynecessary to legislate mandatory diversion prodemand balance. This excess capacity, if maingrams after reserves ach undesirable levels. tained in the base, subjects program cost for Otherwise, a more minimal government interthe wheat program alone to an added $1.5 to vention program containing fewer options will $2.0 billion per year. be necessary. On the positive side, this analysis does indicate that the focus for 1985 will be on more
ISSUES FOR THE 1985 FARM BILL
economical methods of acreage control and proIn order that we monitor the agricultural grams that will enhance export expansion. Supsector on a continuous basis, the agricultural ply controls will run the gamut from mandatory modeling unit at the University of Missouri in to no government programs. Based on previous conjunction with Wharton Econometrics Foreprogram popularity with farmers, some type of casting Associates conducts a longer term outvoluntary program is likely. If so, considerable look semiannually (Wharton). This exercise, flexibility must be built in to accommodate the completed in the later part of 1983 suggests rather wide swings that have occurred in supply the potential for excess supplies in the face of and demand since the early 1970's. Target prices sluggish export demand with rather significant and loan rates should reflect longer run average budget exposure. This forecast is conditioned costs of regions with the comparative advantage. on a moderate upturn in domestic and foreign Target prices must be maintained at or below economies, and slight declines in interest rates the center of the desired price band. Base acreage and the value of the dollar. These general econshould reflect expected domestic and foreign omy forecasts were obtained from Wharton demand. Excess base area represents potential Econometrics in December of 1983. Also imgovernment treasury exposure and encourages plicit is normal weather in the domestic and producers to maintain marginal land in proforeign markets.
duction. Given that the chance of good to normal Ideally, excess base area offers the opportuweather is greater than poor, this set of pronity for conservation strategies. Also, experijections may reflect the more likely intermediate ence with the bid option under the PIK program suggests that this strategy should be considered supplies. Cartel and marketing boards will be in obtaining desired acreage in a set aside year.
considered. Given the previous unpopularity of This strategy precludes a blanket diversion paymandatory programs in the major crop grain ment on all lands and places the administration area, it is unlikely that this option will be in a position of stronger control over the unadopted in the near term. certainty of program participation and cost.
Finally, this research is another indication of Counties with erodible lands could be treated the necessity for consideration of longer run accordingly.
implications of farm program design. AlternaExport program options are also being detive strategies must be evaluated around the bated, ranging from free-market to marketing uncertainties of future supply and demand. This boards and cartel strategies. Combined with may necessitate the evaluation of several "what these options is the potential for significant c trade subsidies or a trade war. If the more free enarios efore a stamp market strategy is maintained, considerable atgiven. The lessen of the last 4 years simply tention will be given to the bottom side support reaffirms the condition of flexibility in farm price that maintains comparative advantage in program options. If the buffer stock strategy is world trade. maintained, these flexibilities must allow for It will be necessary to ascertain whether loan cross-commodity interaction relative to the unrates are stifling exports and stimulating foreign derlying rules for efficient program operation.
